The Interface Between the Doctrines of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will: Judas Iscariot as a Testcase

Abstract

The New Testament indicates that Judas Iscariot’s betrayal of Jesus was foreknown by God and by Jesus, and that it was in fulfilment of Scripture, and yet at the same time it judges him culpable for his actions. In that case, to what degree is divine foreknowledge compatible with human free will? This represents a difficult challenge and demands investigation. How does the Bible envisage the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free willwith particular reference to the case of Judas Iscariot? The gospels persistently use παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot instead of προδίδωμιor προδότης (except Luke’s single use of προδότης with him, Luke 6:16). This study discovers their possible reason(s) for doing so. Thus, this study examines relevant New Testament passages, which explicitly or implicitly identify Judas Iscariot. Determining how Judas Iscariot’s choice to carry out his act of betrayal fits into God’s choice and foreknowledge of him is significant. Thus, the study surveys the views of philosophers, major Christian traditions andsomeliterature of Second Temple Judaism in order to assemble some of the solutions to the problem being investigated. It is observed that all the New Testament passages in relation to Judas Iscariot underline the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in a non-contrastive transcendent manner, even though some place different emphases on the degree of this compatibility, and others underline a complicated role fo reven Satan. Specifically, it is asserted that when it comes to Judas Iscariot, the New Testament holds divine foreknowledge in tension with human freedom to the extent that there is no conflict between them, apparent though that might seem. Some of the differences in emphases between the Gospels with regard to Judas Iscariot are also shown to reflect respective socio-pastoral contexts of their first readers.

The New Testament indicates that Judas Iscariot’s betrayal of Jesus was foreknown by God and by Jesus, and that it was in fulfilment of Scripture, and yet at the same time it judges him culpable for his actions. In that case, to what degree is divine foreknowledge compatible with human free will? This represents a difficult challenge and demands investigation. How does the Bible envisage the interface between the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and human free willwith particular reference to the case of Judas Iscariot? The gospels persistently use παραδίδωμι with Judas Iscariot instead of προδίδωμιor προδότης (except Luke’s single use of προδότης with him, Luke 6:16). This study discovers their possible reason(s) for doing so. Thus, this study examines relevant New Testament passages, which explicitly or implicitly identify Judas Iscariot. Determining how Judas Iscariot’s choice to carry out his act of betrayal fits into God’s choice and foreknowledge of him is significant. Thus, the study surveys the views of philosophers, major Christian traditions andsomeliterature of Second Temple Judaism in order to assemble some of the solutions to the problem being investigated. It is observed that all the New Testament passages in relation to Judas Iscariot underline the interplay between divine foreknowledge and human free will in a non-contrastive transcendent manner, even though some place different emphases on the degree of this compatibility, and others underline a complicated role fo reven Satan. Specifically, it is asserted that when it comes to Judas Iscariot, the New Testament holds divine foreknowledge in tension with human freedom to the extent that there is no conflict between them, apparent though that might seem. Some of the differences in emphases between the Gospels with regard to Judas Iscariot are also shown to reflect respective socio-pastoral contexts of their first readers.